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The main purpose of this paper is to merge together two
strands of the literature regarding, either directly or indirectly,
in￿ ation: the PPP and the Phillips curve ones. In order to ac-
complish this task, this contribution applies the tools of the Em-
pirical Growth Literature and of Dynamic Panel Data estimation
on a sample of 81 Italian provinces from the year 1986 to the
year 1998, exploiting cross-sectional variation to avoid to use in-
struments not directly connected with the in￿ ation generating
process. This research strategy allows to conclude that in￿ ation
is characterized by a low degree of persistence and by conditional
￿￿convergence across provinces. Its most suitable driving vari-
able is the unemployment rate and there are long-term non neu-
tralities at the regional level.
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11 Motivation for the Study
In￿ ation and prices have been studied so far by di⁄erent approaches. On
the one hand, there is a strand of literature dealing with in￿ ation at a
very aggregate level for a single country trying to discover its underlying
statistical process as the result of either demand or supply pressures.
This literature is usually labelled as the Phillips curve one, either in
its traditional form or in the New Keynesian one. On the other hand,
there are papers that deal with the issues of the law of one price and of
purchasing power parity (PPP), therefore typically considering a number
of di⁄erent countries in the attempt to understand if either the level or
the rate of change of prices tends to converge or not.
More recently a number of papers, reviewed below, shifted the focus
from between countries di⁄erences to within country di⁄erences by con-
sidering regional in￿ ation di⁄erentials. This step can be considerably
important for new monetary unions because it can help to understand
if their members, passing from the status of countries to that of regions
by losing their independence in monetary policy, are destined to long
lasting in￿ ation di⁄erences or to fast convergence.
The purpose of this paper is to build a bridge between these two
strands of the literature in order to help to overcome the limits that
they have reached. As it will appear from the literature review that
follows, the New Keynesian Phillips curve literature have had problems
in ￿nding the right degree of persistence of the in￿ ation rate and what is
the independent variable that best helps to explain in￿ ation movements.
Furthermore, Abadir and Talmain (2002) showed that output persistence
could just be the result of aggregation, so moving from a very aggregate
level to the meso level can o⁄er a way to empirically test this claim.
This very change is going to be helpful also in solving the problem
of the selection of the exogenous variable driving the in￿ ation rate, oth-
erwise known as the ￿forcing variable￿in the New Keynesian literature.
In fact as argued by Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1994), but also by
Arellano and HonorØ (2001), estimating a model statistically very simi-
lar to those estimated below, cross-sectional variability o⁄ers invaluable
means to identify the model parameters, that time-series studies cannot
exploit. Furthermore, moving from the national to the regional level
o⁄ers a way to reassess a very old controversy, that of a long run ver-
tical Phillips curve. In this context, Hughes-Hallet (2000) argued that
by redistributing demand between regions it is possible to minimize the
long-run national unemployment rate, even in presence of vertical long-
run Phillips curves at the regional level.
Finally, the New Keynesian literature has tried to understand what is
the right speci￿cation of a micro-founded model for in￿ ation. However,
2it often neglected the issue if ￿new knowledge￿is any better than ￿old
wisdom￿ . In other words, can the traditional Phillips curve perform any
better than the New Keynesian one? This is one of the major questions
that I am going to tackle in this paper.
Regarding the PPP literature, it has recently moved some steps from
the analysis of between countries to within countries price or in￿ ation
di⁄erentials in the attempt to test if in￿ ation di⁄erentials are really long
lasting also in absence of exogenous factors hampering long run price
or in￿ ation convergence. The literature have traditionally focused on
absolute convergence between in￿ ation rates (prices) in di⁄erent places,
either countries or regions. This is because, if the PPP hypothesis holds,
the real exchange rate
Pfe
P - where Pf is the foreign level of prices, e is the
exchange rate and P is the domestic level of prices - will be a constant,












f(t); P 0(t) and e0(t) are time derivatives. Under ￿xed exchange





P(t) , in principle entailing that in￿ ation
rates should converge to the same value in di⁄erent regions (absolute
￿-convergence). Indeed, in this contribution the PPP hypothesis will
not be tested checking for cointegration among regional prices, rather
particular care will be devoted to assessing the convergence property of
local in￿ ation rates, by estimating a ￿￿convergence equation (see eq.
6).
To this purpose and as discussed in detailed below, the New Keyne-
sian and Traditional Phillips curves may well o⁄er models of conditional
beta convergence (Sala-i-Martin, 1996) alternative to the beta conver-
gence equation that is usually borrowed from the theoretical growth
literature, but that has no economic content when applied to in￿ ation.
Moreover, in this context the problems of the selection of the right
￿forcing variable￿and of the assessment of which model ￿ts the data bet-
ter between the New Keynesian Phillips curve and the traditional one
assumes new signi￿cance. The literature on in￿ ation di⁄erentials high-
lighted di⁄erent mechanisms that may explain their long half-life, such
as productivity growth di⁄erentials between sectors (Balassa-Samuelson
e⁄ect), in￿ ationary bottlenecks caused by market rigidities unevenly
spread across the economy or demand pressures a⁄ecting some sectors
or regions more than others.
The selection between a ￿cost based￿or an ￿output gap￿Phillips
curve should help to understand if the ￿rst two stories are more reliable
than the latter. If the ￿rst model, based on real unit labour costs, ￿ts
3the data better, then in￿ ation di⁄erentials will probably have supply
side causes, whereas if the latter does the job better then demand pres-
sures and good market imperfections are likely to be the most important
factors. On the other hand, if it is possible to ￿nd that the traditional
Phillips curve ￿ts the data better, it will have two implications. First
regions with a higher unemployment rate lack e⁄ective demand, hav-
ing lower in￿ ation rates than regions with a lower unemployment rate.
Second, lower in￿ ation rates will mean higher real interest rates, con-
straining further aggregate demand.
Furthermore, shifting from absolute to conditional convergence may
be particularly interesting, because one of the major ￿nding in the PPP
literature, in contrast with the New Keynesian literature, is that in￿ ation
does not converge quickly and that in￿ ation half-life is rather long. This
high degree of persistence may, in fact, hide conditional convergence and
this is one of the hypothesis that this contribution is going to test.
One other major issue for the PPP literature is its inability to explain
satisfactorily the fact that in￿ ation usually displays beta convergence
but not smooth sigma convergence and the high volatility of the in￿ a-
tion rates, namely their high probability to move from high levels to low
levels or viceversa in di⁄erent time periods. Once noticed these puzzles,
it is customary to argue that beta convergence and sigma convergence
are linked but do not coincide as sigma convergence depends also on pos-
sible disturbances deriving from exogenous shocks (Sala-i-Martin, 1996,
Cannon and Duck, 2000 and Bliss, 2000)1. Moreover, these very shocks
can help explaining the high volatility of in￿ ation rates.
By using a forward looking Phillips curve speci￿cation of the model,
it is not only possible to shed some more light into the black box of the
variance of the exogenous disturbance but also to understand that in￿ a-
tion expectations may play an important role not only in determining
the in￿ ation aggregate level but also its cross-sectional variation, help-
ing to explain the wanders of the dispersion of regional in￿ ation rates as
well as their volatility. The traditional regional PPP literature could not
grasp this point because it focused only on backward looking models.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Sections 2 and 3 give
a picture of the Phillips curve and the PPP literatures. This review will
1In absence of shocks beta and sigma convergence would coincide. Suppose in
fact that in￿ ation is generated by AR(1) process ￿it = ￿ + ￿￿it￿1 without shocks,
￿it￿1 is the rate of in￿ ation in province i at time t￿1. Suppose also that E (￿t￿1) =
￿t￿1 and that V ar(￿t￿1) = ￿2
t￿1: This will imply that E (￿t) = ￿ + ￿￿t￿1 and
V ar(￿t) = E [￿t ￿ E (￿t)]
2 = E
￿








2V ar(￿t￿1). Hence V ar(￿t) < V ar(￿t￿1) if ￿ < 1. It is the presence of shocks, as
correctly stated by Bliss (2000), that makes ￿￿convergence neither a su¢ cient nor
a necessary condition for ￿-convergence.
4also o⁄er a way to introduce the models that will be estimated and to
further assess the importance of merging the two models under concern.
Section 4 describes the dataset and shows some of its features in terms
of the distribution and cross-sectional volatility of in￿ ation rates. The
aim of this exercise will be to see if the dataset ￿ts the main stylized
facts appeared in the literature so far and if the proposed explaining
variables display similar patterns to in￿ ation. Section 5 o⁄ers a brief
methodological review to highlight the reasons underlying the choice of
the method of estimation, system GMM, and to o⁄er an introduction
to spatial ￿ltering. Section 6 is devoted to the main estimation results
and, following Weber and Beck (2003), it will assess the relationship
between the average level of in￿ ation and its regional dispersion. Section
7 concludes.
2 The New Keynesian Phillips Curve
Lucas (1976) argued that traditional policy evaluation exercises were
￿ awed by the interaction of policy interventions and economic agents￿
expectations and spurred a new e⁄ort to build solid microfoundations
for macroeconomic models. One of the results, regarding monetary is-
sues, was a reinterpretation of the Phillips Curve in the context of the
analysis of the rules for monetary policy (see for instance Clarida, Gali
and Gertler, 1999). However, the performance of the structural Phillips
curve, otherwise known as New-Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC here-
after), has raised a not less keen debate than its old counterpart mainly
on the ground that the reliability of Taylor-type interest rate rules hinges
on good estimates of the parameters of the Phillips curve (Rotemberg
and Woodford, 1997, Levin, Wieland, and Williams, 1999 and Roberts,
1998).
Before moving to consider the results of empirical estimates, it is
worth brie￿ y considering how the New Keynesian Phillips curve is ob-
tained by standard microfoundations. Building on the New-Keynesian
literature about monopolistic competition and di⁄erentiated goods (Rotem-
berg, 1982, Mankiw, 1985, Svensson, 1986 and Blanchard and Kyotaki,
1987), the New Keynesian Phillips Curve can be obtained from the price-
setting problem for a pro￿t maximising ￿rm in the context of monop-
olistic competition. Each ￿rm has a small amount of monopoly power






















i￿t;i is the rate at which the ￿rm discounts earnings at time t+i,
Pt (z) is the price set by the z-th ￿rm, Pt is the aggregate price index,
MCn
t is the nominal marginal cost, Yt (z) is the output of the z-th ￿rm,
Yt is the aggregate level of output and ￿ is the probability a ￿rm has not
to reset its price in a Calvo price setting model.
The solution to the problem above gives the optimal price P ￿
t (z),









and after log-linearising gives the New-Keynesian Phillips curve:
^ ￿t = ￿^ mct + ￿Et^ ￿t+1 (3)
Under certain conditions one can write
^ ￿t = ￿k^ yt + ￿Et^ ￿t+1 (4)
where k is the elasticity of the marginal cost with respect to the output
gap, ￿ is a function of the structural parameters, ^ ￿ is the deviation from
steady state of in￿ ation, ^ mct is the deviation from steady state of the
marginal cost and ^ yt is the deviation from steady state of the output
gap. The last two equations already show two possible ways to estimate
the New Keynesian Phillips Curve, one using as forcing variable a proxy
for the real marginal cost and the other by using the output gap2.
Though the traditional Phillips Curve is backward-looking, the New-
Keynesian Phillips Curve (hereafter NKPC) derived from standard mi-
crofoundations is purely forward-looking. Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997, 1999) found empirical support for this model once allowing a
serially correlated error term, however Roberts (1997, 1998 and 2005),
Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and Estrella and Fuhrer (2002) found opposite
results. The controversial empirical performance of the model induced
the literature to take two steps. In the ￿rst place, in￿ ation lags were
introduced under the hypothesis that some agents form their in￿ ation
expectations by looking at its past values. Secondly, the forcing variable
was changed from the output gap to the real marginal cost, which, being
an unobservable, has been proxied by the real unit labour cost:
2For a complete derivation of the New-Keynesian Phillips curve see Gertler (2002).
6^ ￿t = ￿^ mct + ￿fEt^ ￿t+1 + ￿b^ ￿t￿1 (5)
where ^ mct is deviation of the real marginal cost from steady state. The
model above was labelled the ￿hybrid model￿and successfully estimated
by both GMM and a two-step distance-VAR method (Gali and Gertler,
1999, Gali, Gertler and L￿pez-Salido, 2001, and Sbordone, 2001).
This model speci￿cation attracted a considerable attention. Guerri-
eri (2001) showed that the estimate of Gali and Gertler (1999) are not
robust to alternative normalizations of the moment conditions, though
their normalization appears to be superior to other alternatives in a
Monte-Carlo experiment, and that using Taylor-style contracts instead
of Calvo ones the share of backward looking ￿rms increases dramati-
cally. Roberts (2005) found that the result of tiny relevance of backward
looking pricing behavior of both Gali and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone
(2002) hinges on proxying the marginal cost by real unit labour cost
and that exactly this fact allows an interpretation of their result in the
light of a traditional aggregate Phillips curve. Jondeau and Le Bihan
(2005) - by using both the GMM and the ML estimators on data from
Europe, the US, the UK, France, Germany and Italy - found that the
NKPC has to be augmented with additional in￿ ation lags and leads,
that there is a large fraction of backward looking ￿rms and that the
most suitable forcing variable for the UK and the US is the marginal
cost while for the other countries it is the output gap. Dupuis (2004),
by contrast, ￿nds that for US data an NKPC with the output gap pro-
vides better in￿ ation forecasts than both the NKPC with the marginal
cost and that with polynomial adjustment costs as proposed by Kozicki
and Tinsley (2002 a, b). On the other hand, Gagnon and Kahn (2005)
by considering US, Canadian and Euro area data and tackling aggrega-
tion issues using both a Cobb-Douglas production function and a CES
technology obtained the following results: ignoring aggregation issues
gives implausible price stickiness and the marginal cost is a better forc-
ing variable than the output gap when using a CES technology instead
of a Cobb-Douglas one, particularly for Canada and the Euro area.
Kurmann (2005) argued that the results obtained by Gali and Gertler
(1999) and Sbordone (2002) hinge on both the calibration of the struc-
tural pricing equation implied by the Calvo model and the reliability of
a reduced form forecasting process for the real marginal cost and that
both the assumptions are questionable. Sbordone (2005), giving a more
general interpretation of her previous work, stressed that the issue of
uncertainty can be tackled with her methodology while the preliminary
stationarity-inducing transformations, the size of the model and the lag
length are still open questions. Cogley and Sbordone (2005) addressed
7the time invariance of the deep parameters by using a two-step method:
￿rst they estimated a VAR with drifting parameters, then taking as
given the parameter estimates of the unrestricted VAR they estimated
the NKPC by minimising a quadratic function of the restrictions that
the theoretical model imposes on the reduced form. They found that it
is possible to reconcile a time-drifting VAR with a constant parameter
NKPC con￿rming its structural stability.
Neiss and Nelson (2002) argued that the better performance of ￿cost
based￿with respect to ￿output gap based￿Phillips curves is mainly due
to the inappropriateness of the most widespread output gap measures
for DSGE models, not considering that in this context potential output
is a⁄ected by real shocks and that output gap is not a business cycle
indicator rather than one of nominal rigidities. Consequently, they pro-
pose a new output gap measure, as an approximated in￿nite lag sum
of preference and technological shocks, consistent with DSGE models.
They ￿nd that a NKPC based on this output gap proxy ￿ts Australian,
UK and US data well.
Rudd and Whelan (2005) showed that time-series GMM is not able to
distinguish between a forward-looking and a backward looking Phillips
Curve due to speci￿cation errors and to the apparent irrelevance of both
forward-looking expectations for the current rate of in￿ ation and of past
in￿ ation rates to present values of the forcing variable. LindØ (2005)
also pointed out that estimating the model by non-linear least squares,
in order to avoid the problems emphasized by Rudd and Whelan (2005),
provides evidence against the New-Keynesian Phillips Curve, that time-
series GMM estimates are biased and that estimating the model with full
information maximum likelihood seems a more attractive procedure.
Gali, Gertler and L￿pez-Salido (2005) replied that the closed form
used by Rudd and Whelan (2005) does not allow a satisfactory evaluation
of the hybrid model because based on the null hypothesis of a purely
forward-looking in￿ ation generating process, that the results obtained by
LindØ (2005) with NLS are plagued by endogeneity of the independent
variables and that the FIML estimator assumes that the econometrician
has a good deal of knowledge regarding the true model of the economy.
However, the NKPC did not manage to survive a sensitivity analysis of
the instrument set and a battery of speci￿cation tests in B￿rdsen et al.
(2005).
Both Roberts (1995 and 2005) and Sbordone (2005) pointed out that
the cost based version of the NKPC leaves unexplained the movements of
the marginal costs and the former that, given labour hoarding, very often
marginal cost and unit labour costs are not thought to move together.
In order to overcome this shortcoming, Blanchard and Gali (2005), on
8the ground of Trigari (2004), proposed to use as forcing variable the un-
employment rate, o⁄ering microfoundations for the traditional Phillips
curve augmented with expectations.
3 The PPP Literature
3.1 From Time Series to Cross Section Studies
The PPP literature was subject in the past to a series of methodological
shifts. Early studies were mainly concerned with time series data, at-
tempting to compare the percentage changes in bilateral exchange rates
with in￿ ation di⁄erentials. Their failure to ￿nd evidence in favour of the
PPP hypothesis spurred an attempt to collect data for very long time
series, in order to dispel the doubts concerning the low power of tests
used to detect convergence towards a long-run equilibrium. The results
this time were in favour of the PPP hypothesis, with deviations from
PPP having an half-life of around 4 years (Frankel and Rose, 1996).
This solution to the problem was not without its own shortcomings
because long time series are subject to potentially serious structural
shifts. Therefore, Frankel and Rose (1996) proposed to consider a cross-
sectional approach in order to achieve the necessary degree of variation
in the data to obtain enough powerful tests. Building on this method-
ological change, Imbs et al. (2005) showed that, considering sectoral
heterogeneity, the half-life of the real exchange rate may fall from the
￿consensus view￿of 3-5 years to eleven months.
A similar concern could be raised regarding the NKPC literature,
because the debate between LindØ (2005) on one side and Gali, Gertler
and L￿pez-Salido (2005) on the other showed two important facts. First,
the choice to use an instrumental variable estimator or not can have
dramatic consequences on the very sign of the parameters under concern.
Second, to obtain results in favour of the New Keynesian Phillips curve
it is necessary to use instruments that are not directly connected with
the speci￿ed stochastic process for in￿ ation, allegedly on the ground that
they are used by agents to form their expectation, though the way these
expectations are formed is not speci￿ed or investigated at all3.
Furthermore, using a panel data approach may help not only to over-
come the problem of heavy instrumentation, but also that of potential
3For instance, the GMM estimation performed in Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) uses as
instruments four lags of in￿ ation, the labor share of income, the long-short interest
rate spread, the output gap, wage in￿ ation, and commodity price in￿ ation. In Gal￿,
Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2001) a more parsimonious instrument set was chosen,
including not only four lags in the in￿ ation rate but also two lags in the real marginal
cost, in de-trended output and wage in￿ ation for both the cost based and the output
gap based NKPC.
9structural shifts in datasets that usually start in the sixties and therefore
include di⁄erent monetary policy regimes and, potentially, di⁄erent way
for agents to form their expectations.
One other major ￿nding of the PPP literature, is that the catching
up process of countries with a low level of prices towards those with
a higher one cannot o⁄er a completely satisfactory explanation for in-
￿ ation di⁄erentials between countries and that factors other than price
convergence can explain most of the cross-country in￿ ation di⁄erences
(Rogers, 2001). This points to the potential bene￿ts that can be reaped
by merging the PPP literature with the Phillips curve one, because this
can help to better understand what these factors are.
3.2 The Regional PPP Literature
The presence of factors hampering the adjustment of relative prices (in-
￿ ation rates) spurred researchers to move to consider regional datasets,
as another way to predict if countries joining a monetary union were
doomed to go through a long lasting adjustment process or destined to
a quick smooth convergence. Among the main factors hampering rela-
tive price adjustment it is possible to list: a) tari⁄barriers; b) non-tari⁄
barriers; c) nominal exchange rates failing to adjust to relative price-
level shocks; d) market imperfections allowing ￿rms to apply di⁄erent
price policies in di⁄erent countries; e) costs in adjusting prices; f) trans-
portation costs hampering arbitrage between di⁄erent countries; g) the
presence of non traded goods, for which arbitrage is impossible (Cec-
chetti et al., 2002).
Other explanations that have been o⁄ered by the literature to explain
price (in￿ ation) di⁄erentials are: i) a positive correlation between the
level of income and the level of prices, implying that catching up regions
or economies should experience positive in￿ ation di⁄erentials; ii) macro-
economic disequilibria, whereby it is not said that all the regions within
a country experience the same demand pressures; iii) even in presence
of the same demand pressures there might be di⁄erent market rigidities,
implying stronger or weaker in￿ ationary bottlenecks (Alberola, 2000).
It is worth noting that an output gap based NKPC should be able to
verify if these hypotheses ￿nd any support in the data, because in￿ ation
should be found to positively depend on the di⁄erence between actual
output and the natural output, which is larger the stronger are demand
pressures4 or the greater are market imperfections5.
One of the major studies of ￿within countries￿price di⁄erences is
4That should be sizeable for catching up economies.
5According to microfounded models, without market imperfections the di⁄erence
between actual and nominal output would not exist.
10Cecchetti et al. (2002) who analysed a dataset of the price indexes of 19
major US cities from 1918 to 1995 with the following characterization of
the data:




where qit is the log of the price level of city i at time t, ￿i is a city speci￿c
constant, ￿t is a time speci￿c constant and ￿ij are the lag coe¢ cients in
the process characterizing qit. They found that, considering the whole
sample, relative price adjustment has an half-life of 8.5 years6. They
proposed three explanations for such a slow convergence: distance - on
the account that the price di⁄erential between two cities is larger the
farther the two cities are -, di⁄erent adjustment costs for small and large
deviations and non traded goods. Remarkably, they did not manage to
￿nd any statistical support for these three explanations. They also could
not test if the real wage or productivity di⁄erentials could a⁄ect their
results due to data constraints. Here it is possible to perform a similar
exercise but with data on a greater number of variables and it is possible
to see that in fact high persistence may hide conditional convergence.
Parsley and Wei (1996) analysed a quarterly data set including 51
￿nal tradable and non-tradable goods and services from 48 cities from
1975 to 1992. They ￿nd that distance, proxying for arbitrage costs, does
a⁄ect the size of price di⁄erences and its convergence rate, therefore the
more two cities are distant the more price di⁄erentials are variable and
wide and the longer they take to converge. A similar role for distance was
found by Engel and Rogers (1996a). Besides the role of distance, Parsley
and Wei (1996) highlighted that prices of tradable goods converge faster
than non-tradable ones, in contrast with the results found by Cecchetti
et al. (2002).
Finally, Weber and Beck (2003) analysed a panel of 77 European
regions from 1991 to 2002 using monthly data and a very similar model
to Cecchetti et al. (2002) but for in￿ ation instead of the price level.
They ￿nd that: i) regional in￿ ation rates do not display smooth sigma
convergence; ii) they do display a lot of internal volatility - whereby
regions with a high in￿ ation ranking in the present may have a low
one in the future; iii) there is a positive relationship between regional
in￿ ation dispersion and mean which can allow central banks to decrease
the average in￿ ation down to 1% without having a sizeable percentage
of regions to enter de￿ ation; iv) mean-reversion takes place at a slow
6Though it displays a sizeable subsample variability, reaching the value of nearly
53 years in the period from 1956 to 1975.
11pace, that is in￿ ation half-life can be rather long, ranging from 0.5 to
75.1 years for di⁄erent sub-samples.
3.3 The Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis
The e⁄ect of productivity growth di⁄erentials is one of the major topic
of the literature of in￿ ation di⁄erentials within countries and it can be
traced back to the pioneering studies of Balassa (1964) and Samuelson
(1964). The Balassa-Samuelson model hinges on the distinction between
a tradable and a non-tradable sector. In the former, prices are deter-
mined on the international market and a strong productivity growth
takes place, whereas in the latter prices are determined locally and pro-
ductivity growth is weak. The two sectors are assumed to have the
same wage which is linked to productivity growth in the tradable sec-
tor. Therefore, the faster productivity grows the stronger is the wage
push and the greater is in￿ ation in the non-tradable sector, where pro-
ductivity growth cannot absorb the increase in the wage bill (Alberola,
2000). In other terms, there should be a positive relationship between
productivity growth and in￿ ation.
However, the assumptions of the same wage across di⁄erent sectors,
or even of a constant ratio between wages of di⁄erent sectors, seems very
restrictive even supposing the presence of large unions and taking into
account that wage bargaining takes often place along sectoral lines7. It
seems advisable to consider as regressor not productivity growth, but
the real unit labour cost, like in the New Keynesian Phillips Curve,
because it is known that individual wage bargaining is very widespread
and can lead to regional di⁄erentials in nominal wages - that in Italy,
for instance, are known to be around 20% (Vaona, 2003). Therefore, the
real unit labour cost may more easily account for the opposing forces of
productivity growth and wage costs on in￿ ation.
This could be one of the reasons why the Balassa-Samuelson hypoth-
esis was rejected in Spain at the provincial level (Alberola and MarquØs,
1999). Further evidence against the Balassa-Samuelson e⁄ect was found
also by considering countries instead of regions. For instance, Rogers
(2001) points to the fact that in the year 2000, Portugal, Ireland and
to some extent Greece had both high in￿ ation and productivity growth,
but this was not so for Austria and Spain. Honohan and Lane (2003) de-
tected a negative cross-sectional correlation between productivity growth
and in￿ ation in the period 1997-2001.
7For instance in Italy, during the nineties, the wage purchasing power was stable
in the manufacturing and trade sectors and declining in agriculture and other service
sectors (Birindelli, D￿ Aloia and Megale, 2003).
123.4 In￿ ation Di⁄erentials Within EMU
Another strand of the literature to be considered is that concerning in-
￿ ation di⁄erentials within EMU. Busetti et al. (2006) could not reject
the hypothesis of convergence between 1980 and 1997, but they could
between 1998 and 2003. In this period the formation of three clusters
was detected: a low in￿ ation group - including Germany, France, Bel-
gium, Austria, Finland and Luxemburg ￿ , a high in￿ ation one - including
Spain, the Netherlands, Greece, Portugal and Ireland ￿with Italy, con-
stituting the third group, staying in between. These clusters resulted
to be driven by the dynamics of unit labour cost, but also by those
of productivity and mark-ups, stressing the importance of conditional
￿￿convergence to understand in￿ ation di⁄erentials.
It is possible to reach similar conclusions considering Honohan and
Lane (2003) who found that in￿ ation di⁄erentials in Europe can be ex-
plained by the di⁄erent impact the Euro devaluation had on the member
states of the monetary union, together with di⁄erences in the output
gap. Angeloni and Ehrmann (2004) stressed the role of three mecha-
nisms to explain in￿ ation di⁄erentials in a monetary union. First of all,
high in￿ ation countries will have a lower ex-post real interest rate and,
if in￿ ation expectations are country speci￿c, even a lower ex-ante real
interest rate (dis-equilibrating mechanism). Secondly and in contrast, a
high in￿ ation country will tend to lose price competitiveness, reducing
its aggregate demand and output (re-equilibrating mechanism). Thirdly,
in￿ ation stickiness will help to propagate in￿ ation di⁄erentials, due to
the inability of the di⁄erent countries to adjust in￿ ation rates quickly.
4 The Dataset and Its Features
The dataset covers in￿ ation rates in CPI, unemployment rates, the value
added and the real unit labour cost for 81 Italian provinces at annual
frequency from 1986 to 1999. Data about in￿ ation rates are produced by
the Italian national statistical o¢ ce (ISTAT) and they are the basis for
the computation of the national index. Also data about unemployment
rates are produced by the Italian statistical o¢ ce, as well as the data
about employment that are used to compute the real unit labour cost.
The Tagliacarne Institute releases every year data for the value added
at the provincial level, whereas the wage bill was proxied by the average
wage for each province resulting from administrative data released by
the Italian Pension Institute (INPS)8.
8The source of the data for in￿ ation, unemployment, employment and the value
added is a valid guarantee against measurement error. Furthermore, these very data
are widely used by local policy makers and workers￿and ￿rms￿associations to assess
13Italy counts 103 provinces, but especially for many Southern provinces
it is impossible to recover the data, so 81 provinces are actually covered.
Out of 868 observations, 448 (46%) come from the North, 204 (24%)
come from the Centre and 216 (30%) come from the South. Though
these percentages are not so far from one another, this could entail a
self-selection problem: estimates may be distorted by the predominance
of Northern provinces. However, as showed later, I run separate regres-
sions for the North and the Centre-South and I could not reject the
null hypothesis of equality between them. Furthermore, the signal to
noise ratio is stronger in the Centre-South than in the North, allowing
to think that the addition of more Southern provinces would con￿rm the
results achieved in this contribution. In the empirical estimates below,
when dealing with regional disparities, in order to assure comparability
in the sub-sample sizes I pooled together the South with the Centre and
I called this sub-sample ￿South￿ . Having two comparable sub-samples
in terms of cross-sectional units is important due to the ￿nite sample
properties of the GMM panel estimator (Alonso-Borrego and Arellano,
1999).
In the economic growth literature, convergence has not been stud-
ied only by making use of regression analysis but also resorting to a
distributional approach after Quah (1996) and Quah (1997) among oth-
ers. In this way, it was possible to highlight that economic convergence
is mainly taking place in clubs and that the distribution of the growth
rates is characterized by ￿emerging twin peaks￿ , that is by a polarization
between a high income and a low income club9. By applying these tools
to in￿ ation or price convergence it is possible to gain similar insights,
as showed by Gluschenko (2004) and Weber and Beck (2003), and to
provide valuable information to point out new stylized facts for regional
in￿ ation di⁄erentials, useful when selecting the best speci￿cation for a
parametric model. In this contribution, I mainly rely on Gaussian Ker-
nel Estimators using Silverman (1986) optimal smoothing bandwidth,
given that di⁄erent kernel functions have been showed not to a⁄ect esti-
mation results in a signi￿cant way (Pagan and Ullah, 1999). For sake of
brevity, I show here only the stochastic kernel for in￿ ation. Its contour
plot together with the stochastic kernels and the contour plots of the
other variables are available from the author upon request..
the state of local economies. Regarding the measure of the real unit labour cost, I
aggregated the data by NUTS 2 regions - the present study is carried out for NUTS
3 regions - and I computed the mean and the standard deviation of the resulting
variable obtaining respectively 0.50 and 0.06. Once taking from the regional accounts
data about the ratio of regional wage and salaries over total households￿income I
obtained a mean of 0.55 and standard deviation of 0.05.
9For a recent survey, see Durlauf and Quah (1999).
14Figure 1 shows the standard deviation and the average of the provin-
cial in￿ ation rates for each year. It appears clear that the years from
1987 to 1998 have been years of de￿ ation, though not of smooth de￿ a-
tion. In fact, the average in￿ ation rate moved up and down until 1991
to decrease markedly between 1991 and 1994, experiencing a new peak
in 1995 and falling markedly again until 199810.
It is also worth stressing that Figure 1 highlights two features of
the in￿ ation generating process that has been found also in Weber and
Beck (2003) and in the literature regarding in￿ ation di⁄erentials in EMU.
First, the lower is the average in￿ ation rate the smaller is its geographical
dispersion, and, second, though in￿ ation dispersion decreases, it does
not do it smoothly alternating periods of sigma convergence to those of
sigma divergence.
Further insights can be gained by considering the stochastic kernels
of the variables under scrutiny. Figure 2 shows the stochastic kernel
for in￿ ation. The fact that the distribution is parallel to the t ￿ ￿ axis
means that in￿ ation passed from high and well dispersed values to low
and more concentrated values. Inspecting the contour plot it is possible
to divide the provinces into two groups, one that had medium or low
in￿ ation rates in 1987 and kept them in 1998 and one that had high
in￿ ation rates in 1987, but managed to underbid the ￿rst group by the
end of the nineties.
There is evidence that this dichotomy re￿ ects a geographical pat-
tern11. Figure 3 displays the actual data and it has the provincial in￿ a-
tion rates in 1987 on the vertical axis and those in 1998 on the horizontal
one. Again it is possible to see two groups: the ￿rst mainly in the North
having low in￿ ation rates in both the periods and the second group,
mainly in the South, having high in￿ ation rates in 1987 and low in￿ a-
tion rates in 1998. There is clear evidence that the Southern provinces
underwent a period of intense de￿ ation that led them to have lower
in￿ ation rates than their Northern counterparts.
Let us move to consider the candidate forcing variables. The esti-
mated stochastic kernel for the log of the value added appeared to be
clearly placed along the diagonal of the Cartesian plane, indicating a
high degree of persistence in the distribution. The presence of three
peaks in the stochastic kernel showed that Italian provinces can be di-
vided into three groups: those that had a low value added both in 1987
and in 1998, those that had a medium value added in both the years and
10Note that 1987 and 1998 are respectively the ￿rst and the last year of estimation
due to the presence of one in￿ ation lag and of in￿ ation expectations in the model.
11The groups showed in Figures 3-6 were obtained by inspecting the contour plots
of the stochastic kernels of the variables under analysis.
15those that had a high value added in both the years. Inspecting Figure
4 it is possible to conclude that the ￿rst group is mainly composed by
Southern Provinces, the second by Northern Provinces and the third by
four outliers, two in the North and two in the South.
A similar geographic divide emerges by considering the data regard-
ing the unemployment rates. Again the position of the estimated sto-
chastic kernel showed a highly persistent distribution with three groups
of provinces: the high unemployment ones, the medium unemployment
ones and the low unemployment ones. Figure 5 shows that the last group
is mainly composed by Northern Provinces, the second by a mixture of
a minority of Northern provinces and a majority Southern ones and the
￿rst only by Southern provinces.
When considering the log of the real unit labour cost, the contour
plot of the stochastic kernel did not show a stable distribution as in the
previous two cases: the provinces can be divided into three groups: two
groups remained stable around respectively a medium real unit labour
cost and small one, while part of the third group shifted from a high real
unit labour cost to a medium one. Figure 6 shows that the low real unit
labour cost group is composed by an outlier in the North, the medium
one is mainly made by Northern provinces and the partially-shifting
group by Southern provinces.
After a detailed look at the data, it is possible to make some infer-
ences. First of all, the in￿ ation generating process displays a lot of vari-
ability across time in terms of shifts in both its average and dispersion
(Figg. 1 and 2). It is not possible to trace these shifts back to changes
in the candidate explaining variables because they do not display the
same degree of volatility. Therefore, it is clear that a model attempting
to estimate the in￿ ation generating process should include also in￿ ation
lags as done by both the PPP and the Phillips Curve literatures, but also
in￿ ation leads as done only by the Phillips Curve literature; a so high
degree of variability cannot be reduced only to persistence or exogenous
shocks. By contrast in￿ ation expectations are very likely to play a role,
as a volatile factor causing in￿ ation to jump up and down.
However, from the analysis above, it also emerged that there has
been at least another factor that has shifted in￿ ation rates downward
more in the South than in the North and this factor is unlikely to have
been only in￿ ation expectations. By contrast there should be a variable
explaining the geographical concentration of the de￿ ationary process.
It was showed above that among the candidate ￿forcing variables￿ , the
log of the value added and especially the unemployment rate signalled
that the South was lagging behind the North for all the period under
consideration, while also experiencing, in part, a greater reduction in real
16unit labour cost when compared to the North. Therefore, all the three
forcing variables can potentially o⁄er explanatory power to a model and
regression analysis is strongly called for to select the one that best ￿ts
the data.
5 Estimation Methods
The model to be estimated is the following:
^ ￿it = ￿^ xit + ￿fEt^ ￿it+1 + ￿b^ ￿it￿1 + ￿i + ￿t + ￿it (6)
where, as stated above, ^ ￿it is the in￿ ation rate and ^ xit is the forcing
variable, either the log of value added, the unemployment rate or the log
of the real unit labour cost. In the case ^ xit was the the unemployment
rate and the hypothesis ￿f+￿b = 1 holds, then ￿t would be the aggregate
non-accelerating-in￿ ation-unemployment-rate. Also for this reason it is
important to test if ￿f + ￿b = 1. No exchange rate term appears in (6),
because the exchange rate between regions is ￿xed (see equation 1).
In general, a ￿ convergence equation can be written as follows
yit = ￿ + ￿yit￿1 + ￿it (7)
where yit is the variable of interest, ￿ is the common factor and ￿it
is a stochastic error. In the empirical growth literature it has become











￿ log(yi;t￿1) + ￿it (8)
Equation (8); however, does not have any economic content when ap-
plied to in￿ ation and it seems better to resort to a model speci￿cation
similar to (7), and therefore as in (6); which was originally adopted by
scholars studying convergence of heights of di⁄erent generations or of
￿rm sizes (Hart, 1995).
As it is possible to see, (6) requires an instrumental variable estimator
not only because of the lag in in￿ ation that is correlated with the error
component accounting for spatial heterogeneity (￿i), but also because of
the in￿ ation lead which is endogenous because depending not only on
￿i but also on ￿it. The insertion of time e⁄ects will help to tackle the
issues of a time varying natural level of output, overcoming the critique
of Neiss and Nelson (2002), and of serial correlation in the residuals,
in order to have consistent estimates. It will also allow to capture the
e⁄ect of aggregate common factors. ￿i, instead, will account for spatial
di⁄erences in the steady state level of the forcing variable.
17It is necessary to make two further points about (6). First, it is a
model of conditional beta convergence as no constant common factor
appears. In the context of regional in￿ ation di⁄erentials this means that
regional in￿ ation rates will not converge to a unique aggregate value,
but to di⁄erent values depending on the conditioning variables, unless
there exists a vertical long run Phillips curve even at the regional level.
Indeed and in the second place, conditional beta convergence is deeply
connected with the existence of a long-run Phillips Curve at the regional
level, because the long-run in￿ ation rate will depend on the regressor
^ xit, only if ￿f + ￿b 6= 1:
I use the system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and Bond
(1998), which is known to outperform the GMM estimator proposed by
Arellano and Bond (1991) in ￿nite samples. Arellano and Bond (1991)
estimator is based on ￿rst di⁄erencing the model and then using past
levels of the involved variables as instruments. On the other hand, the
system GMM estimator is based on keeping into consideration both the
￿rst di⁄erenced equation and the equation in levels and on using as in-
struments for the former ones the past levels and for the latter ones
the past ￿rst di⁄erences12. As a ￿rst step, I used as instruments all
the available lags of in￿ ation, both in di⁄erences and in levels, and the
current level of the forcing variable. However, as it will appear later, I
also reduced the number of instruments to check for stability of the pa-
rameter estimates. I chose not to use other variables in the instrument
sets, as in Gali and Gertler (1999), because, relying on Arellano and
HonorØ (2001) and Becker, Grossman and Murphy (1994), I exploited
cross-sectional variability to identify parameters, keeping the instrument
set to a minimum size, given also the problems of bias that heavy in-
strumentation can imply for the GMM estimator (Ziliak, 1997).
Therefore the orthogonality conditions used in this study are as fol-
lows
E (^ ￿i;t￿s￿￿it)=0 for t = 3;:::;T and s > 2 (9)
E (^ xit￿￿it)=0 for all t (10)
E (￿it￿^ ￿i;t￿1)=0 for t = 4;:::;T. (11)
12It may be possible to argue that being GMM an extension of 2SLS, one may not
identify ￿f and ￿b; because he is anyway supposing a model for expectations given
that they are correlated with the instruments. However, this is a very restrictive
interpretation of the GMM estimator, whose underlying theory was especially devised
to estimate directly the e⁄ect of expectations on current variables. Furthermore, to
impose the restriction ￿f + ￿b = 1 as an identi￿cation device even though the data
reject it, as in the present application, entails approaching the data with a very strong
prior, even though this may not be justi￿ed (Mankiw, 2001).
18￿it can be rationalized as an expectational error (Gali and Gertler, 1999),
so the ￿rst and the third conditions only imply that past level of in￿ ation
or a function of theirs, such as their ￿rst di⁄erence, are not correlated
to expectational errors. The second equation, instead, implies thinking
to the forcing variable as exogenous to the in￿ ation generating process,
which is consistent with the Phillips curve tradition.
It is worth recalling that after ￿rst di⁄erencing the residuals of the
model above will assume the following form:
￿it = ￿it ￿ ￿it￿1 (12)
Therefore, absence of serial correlation in the original model, necessary
for the validity of (9), will be detected by ￿nding ￿rst order negative
serial correlation and no second order serial correlation in the ￿rst dif-
ferenced residuals, ￿it
13:
It is also worth stressing that in the dynamic panel data literature,
the model error is customarily assumed to be identically and indepen-
dently distributed (Baltagi, 2003), an assumption that would clash with
detecting spatial correlation in the residuals. In order to overcome this
problem, after testing for spatial correlation in the data, I used the
Gri¢ th￿ s eigenfunction decomposition approach to spatial ￿ltering as
recommended by Getis and Gri¢ th (2002). This procedure is based on
regressing both the dependent and the independent variables on those
eigenvectors of (13) with a Moran￿ s I statistic greater than 0.19 (roughly















where N is the cross-sectional dimension of the dataset, T is the time
dimension of the dataset, W is an N ￿ N binary spatial contiguity
matrix, NT is the number of observations in the sample, I is the identity
matrix and 1 is a vector of ones. By spatial contiguity matrix, it is meant
a matrix whose elements, corresponding each to a pair of observations,
are equal to one for observations belonging to contiguous regions and
zero otherwise (Anselin, 1988).





￿ N (0;1) (14)
where S0 is a normalizing factor,








and wij is the element of the i-th row and j-th column of W. As showed
by Anselin and Kelejian (1997), I￿ has an asymptotic normal distrib-
ution14. The meaning of I￿ is that the larger is the ratio between the
weighted and the unweighted sums of the squares of the elements of y
and the stronger is spatial correlation.
It is also worth stressing that spatial ￿ltering assumes a particular
relevance within this context due to the ￿ndings of the PPP literature
that regional di⁄erentials in the level of prices are less and less connected
the greater is the distance between the two locations they belong to
(Engel and Rogers, 1996b and 2001). This also implies that if the path
followed by the level of the prices is less correlated the further is the
distance between locations the less correlated will also be the in￿ ation
rates. In fact, the ￿rst column of Table 1 shows that, in￿ ation, but also
the other variables considered in this contribution, display strong spatial
correlation, that is observations closer in space are more correlated than
those further away.
6 Estimation results
The results of the ￿ltering procedure are showed in Table 1. Though
it was particularly successful for in￿ ation and unemployment and less
e⁄ective for the logs of value added and of real unit labour costs, it deter-
mined a dramatic decrease in the absolute value of the Moran￿ s I statistic
for each variable. It is therefore possible to proceed to estimation on the
ground that the dependent variable is not spatially correlated and that
the GMM method assumes the errors of the model to be independently
and identically distributed, but it does not make any assumption on the
regressors (Baltagi, 2003). Therefore, the crucial issue when evaluating
estimates will be if the residuals display spatial correlation or not, an
issue that will be assessed by appropriate testing.
Table 2 shows the estimation results. The Sargan test as well as the
Arellano and Bond test for ￿rst order and second order serial correlation
support the model. Over-identifying restrictions and the null of no sec-
ond order correlation of the di⁄erenced residuals are not rejected, while,
14An alternative spatial ￿ltering procedure was proposed by Getis and Ord (1992)
and used to detect beta regional growth convergence in Europe by Badinger et al.
(2004). The two procedures have been reviewed by Getis and Gri¢ th (2002) and
showed to be equivalent. I used Gri¢ th￿ s eigenfunction decomposition approach as
computationally more appealing.
20as expected, there is evidence of negative ￿rst order serial correlation in
the di⁄erenced residuals. The Moran￿ s I statistic for the residuals does
not reject the null of no spatial correlation for any of the three models,
testifying the success of the ￿ltering procedure carried out above. For all
the models presented, the coe¢ cient of the in￿ ation lead is comparable
to the aggregate estimates obtained by Jondeau and Le Bihan (2005)
for Italy. However the coe¢ cient of the in￿ ation lag is much smaller,
supporting the view of Imbs et al. (2005) according to which persistence
is a property of aggregate time series that disappears once moving to
analyse disaggregated ones.
Columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 2 give information about which forcing
variable best ￿ts the data. However, neither the log of the value added,
nor the log of the real unit labour cost are signi￿cant at the 5% level
though their coe¢ cients have the expected sign and magnitude. By
contrast, the coe¢ cient of unemployment has the expected negative sign
and it is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero at the 5% level. Therefore, both
the output gap based and the cost based NKPC break down, whereas
the traditional Phillips curve seems a more promising model to depict
the in￿ ation generating process at the regional level in Italy.
Regarding the restriction of the vertical long run Phillips curve (namely
that the sum of the coe¢ cients of in￿ ation lags and leads to be one), a
Wald test strongly rejected it reporting a value of 27.22 with p-value of
0.00.
Furthermore, the signi￿cance of the time dummies imply that the
long run relationship between in￿ ation and unemployment is not a sta-
ble one. Though in presence of a vertical long run Phillips curve time
dummies could be interpreted as changes in the non-accelerating in-
￿ ation unemployment rate, here given the rejection of the hypothesis
￿f + ￿b = 1, they can be interpreted as exogenous shifts in the long-
run in￿ ation-unemployment trade-o⁄. Figure 11, based on the model
speci￿cation of column 4, displays the long-run in￿ ation unemployment
trade-o⁄ for di⁄erent years: it appears clear that the largest outward
and inward shifts took place respectively in 1989 and in 1998, the years
with the higher and the second lower average in￿ ation rates (Fig. 1)15.
In columns 4 and 5, I respectively improved the model speci￿cation
by discarding the non signi￿cant time dummies and I checked for pa-
15It is worth recalling that in order to avoid the dummy variables trap, when
estimating the model with a constant, it is necessary to drop one of the time dummies,
so one cannot directly distinguish what is the impact of the constant and what is the
impact of possible shocks in the year without dummy. In order to accomplish this
task, I considered as intercept of the long-run unemployment in￿ ation trade o⁄ the
average of the value of the coe¢ cient of the dummies and as shifts idiosyncratic to
speci￿c years the deviations from this average.
21rameter stability by running a two-step system GMM estimation with
Windemejir (2005) small sample correction. Results display remarkable
stability and the signi￿cance of unemployment further increases.
Further robustness checks where carried out by considering sub-
sample stability. Columns 6 and 7 show estimation results considering
respectively the years before and after 1993. Point estimates are slightly
di⁄erent. In fact performing a joint Wald test for in￿ ation parameters,
the null of equality between the coe¢ cients of the two sub-period models
was rejected at the 5% level (though not at the 1% level). The test sta-
tistic, distributed as a ￿2 with 2 degrees of freedom, returned a value of
7.66 with a p-value of 0.01. For the parameter of unemployment, instead,
the null of equality across the two sub-periods could not be rejected (the
Wald test returned a value of 0.99 with a p-value of 0.32). On the one
hand, for unemployment this is clearly a case where pooling across time
reduces the coe¢ cient variance: trading in some bias for a reduction in
the noise is a desirable step (Baltagi, 2003). On the other, for in￿ ation
parameters, it is worth considering that in 1992 wage indexation was re-
formed in Italy and therefore a structural break between 1992 and 1993
is what is reasonable to expect. The reform of wage indexation deter-
mined the change from a more forward looking Phillips curve to a more
backward looking one.
The model by Gali and Gertler (1999), though partially rejected by
the data, could be useful to disentangle this puzzle. In their model ￿f
and ￿b are a function of the structural parameters:
￿f ￿
￿￿
￿ + ! [1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
￿b ￿
!
￿ + ! [1 ￿ ￿(1 ￿ ￿)]
where ￿ is the discount factor, ￿ is the share of agents that in a Calvo
price setting equation are locked in past contracts, ! is the share of
backward looking price setters. Wage indexation in Italy before 1993
had a quarterly frequency and it was set by a commission. After 1993 it
became the outcome of the bargaining process between trade unions and
￿rms. It is likely that, before 1993, the high frequency and the public
nature of the process of the adjustments limited both the value of the
past level of prices as predictors of future ones and the bargaining costs
that unions and ￿rms might incur when setting a new wage, reducing the
share of backward lookers and therefore ￿b:16 One further explanation
for this structural break could rely on the marked decrease that the
16Furthermore, from this point of view Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) model is preferable
22average in￿ ation rate experienced between 1992 and 1993. Indeed, the
literature on output persistence have showed that the higher is trend
in￿ ation and the lower is persistence, because agents have an incentive
not to stick to old contracts (Ascari, 2000). So the literature on indexing
might not have thoroughly considered the e⁄ect of trend in￿ ation and
wage bargaining on economic agents￿choices.
More stable results can be obtained by splitting the sample between
North and South (Columns 8 and 9). In the ￿North￿model unemploy-
ment loses signi￿cance. However, a series of Wald tests could not reject
the null that in￿ ation expectations, the in￿ ation lag and the unemploy-
ment rate could be pooled (for in￿ ation expectations it returned a value
of 0.45 with a p-value of 0.5, for in￿ ation lag a value of 2.69 with a
p-value of 0.10 and for unemployment a value of 0.18 with a p-value
of 0.67). Moving the border regions like Tuscany, Umbria and Marche
from the South subsample to the North subsample would not change the
results much and a joint Wald test could not reject poolability, returning
a value of 2.86 with a p-value of 0.41.
As showed in Column 10 of Table 2, I reduced the number of instru-
ments, because one of the critiques moved to the New Keynesian liter-
ature is too heavy instrumentation. To check if too many instruments
badly a⁄ect estimates, I used only two lags of in￿ ation and results are
stable in terms of size, sign and signi￿cance.
Finally, Column 11 in Table 2 shows the results for an AR(1) model
of in￿ ation, comparable for instance to the model estimated by Weber
and Beck (2003). With di⁄erence to the previous speci￿cations that can
be regarded as conditional ￿￿convergence equations, the speci￿cation
in Column 11 is an absolute ￿￿convergence equation. It is worth noting
that the results in Column 8 are robust to spatial heterogeneity, due
to the adoption of the system GMM estimator, and that the Arellano
and Bond tests do not detect serial correlation in the original residuals,
therefore the inclusion of time dummies here is unnecessary. Their inser-
tion, however, would not change the results and estimates are available
from the author upon request.
Comparing the coe¢ cient estimates of Column 11 with those of Col-
umn 4, it appears clear that the danger of estimating absolute conver-
gence equations instead of conditional ones is a substantial overestima-
tion of in￿ ation persistence. Estimating absolute convergence models
may lead to think that in￿ ation rates are converging slowly to the same
value and in fact they are converging to di⁄erent values in di⁄erent
to the one by Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), where the weights of the
in￿ ation lag and of in￿ ation expectation depend only on the discount factor, which
is unlikely to change from one year to the other.
23places, conditional on the forcing variable. This result is not only against
the purchasing power parity hypothesis, but also against the view of a
long-term vertical Phillips curve. The long-term in￿ ation rate will be
di⁄erent in di⁄erent regions only if ￿f + ￿b 6= 1 :
^ ￿i =
￿
1 ￿ ￿f ￿ ￿b
^ xi +
￿i
1 ￿ ￿f ￿ ￿b
This could help to explain why long term processes of real appre-
ciation or depreciation of regional economies take place, as highlighted
by non-parametric results. Furthermore, this could shed more light on
why models such as those in Cecchetti et al. (2002) or Weber and Beck
(2003), omitting the role of the forcing variable, due to data constraints,
and of future expectations, point to a large persistence of in￿ ation or
price di⁄erentials, while the descriptive statistics presented in the very
same papers depict in￿ ation as a volatile phenomenon. Finally, the in-
sertion of the forcing variable, as unemployment, does not only help to
have results more easily reconcilable with descriptive statistics, it also
helps to reconcile better the presence of in￿ ation ￿-convergence and the
absence of a smooth in￿ ation ￿￿convergence. Indeed, (6) does not only
helps to go beyond just saying that in￿ ation dispersion depends on the
dispersion of the disturbance like in absolute convergence models, it also
highlights that in￿ ation dispersion depends on the dispersion of future
in￿ ation expectations, on the dispersion of the ￿rst lag, on the dispersion

















+2￿f￿bCov(E￿t+1;￿t￿1) + 2￿￿bCov(x;￿t￿1) + 2￿￿fCov(x;E￿t+1)
where ￿2 is the symbol for the variance. Therefore, changes in the vari-
ance of expectations or in the variance of the forcing variable or even in
their covariances may explain why we do not observe a smooth sigma
convergence in the data. This implies a pessimistic message regarding
in￿ ation convergence across di⁄erent regions of a monetary union as long
as there exist regional disparities in terms of unemployment or expecta-
tions there will never be a complete convergence.
However, the heterogeneity of in￿ ation expectations is known to de-
pend on the level of in￿ ation (Heymann and Leijonhufvud, 1995; Cukier-
man and Meltzer, 1986 and Ball, 1992) and this could explain why, like
in Weber and Beck (2003), also analysing the dataset here proposed a
positive correlation between the average and the dispersion of in￿ ation
emerges. By using Newey-West standard errors robust to heteroskedas-
ticity and serial correlation it is possible to obtain the following result:





where ￿￿t is the standard deviation of in￿ ation and ￿￿t is the average
in￿ ation rate.
This result, though tentative because based on a small sample, is the
same as that of Weber and Beck (2003) and it carries a great importance
implying that central banks can reduce the real interest rate imbalances
between high in￿ ation regions and low in￿ ation ones by decreasing the
aggregate in￿ ation rate and they can do it without a sizeable portion of
regions within the monetary union to fall into de￿ ation.
As showed by Weber and Beck (2003), using the equation for the
dispersion of in￿ ation and assuming that within each cross-section in-
￿ ation is normally distributed17, it is possible to compute the critical
in￿ ation rates that force a given percentage of regions into de￿ ation.
Table 3 shows the results for the present study. Though not adjusting
in￿ ation standard deviation, a 2% average in￿ ation rate will entail that
more than 2% of regions is in de￿ ation, adjusting it according to (17),
the 2% of regions will be in de￿ ation with a 0.8% average in￿ ation rate,
due to the reduction in in￿ ation regional dispersion. Therefore, though
in￿ ation rates may follow di⁄erent paths in di⁄erent regions, monetary
policy can a⁄ect the dispersion of these paths.
7 Conclusions
The main purpose of this paper is to merge together two strands of the
literature regarding in￿ ation, the PPP and the Phillips curve ones, in
the attempt to reassess some of their open questions. As a consequence
a number of issues have been raised.
In the ￿rst place, in accordance with the ￿nding of the NKPC lit-
erature and with the descriptive statistics usually provided in the PPP
literature, but contrary to the ￿ndings of the regression analyses of the
PPP literature, with the exception of Imbs et al. (2005), in￿ ation persis-
tence appears to be rather small: the implied half-life of the results of this
contribution, computed as
log0:5
log￿b ; is 0.42 years or 5 months. However,
in￿ ation is not characterized by absolute ￿-convergence, but by con-
ditional ￿-convergence, because as highlighted by the literature above
there are not only ￿equilibrating￿mechanisms, such as arbitrage, but
17The hypothesis of normal distribution was rejected only for the years 1987 and
1995 by a skewness-kurtosis test run for all the years of the sample. Therefore, it is
possible to think that normal cross-sectional distribution can be considered a good
approximation of the data also in this application.
25also ￿dis-equilibrating￿ones, such as di⁄erent real interest rates in dif-
ferent regions.
Comparing di⁄erent models proposed by the traditional and the New
Keynesian Phillips curve literature, it is possible to see that in this ap-
plication ￿old wisdom￿beats ￿new knowledge￿ . In other terms, though
non parametric analysis of the data would allow to think that the ￿cost
based￿or the ￿output gap￿based Phillips curve could equally ￿t the
data as the traditional Phillips curve, regression analysis shows that this
is in fact superior because unemployment is the only signi￿cant forcing
variable.
The comparison regarding what is the most suitable model speci-
￿cation was not only fruitful to compare di⁄erent economic schools of
thought, it also allowed to understand which of the three explanations
proposed by the regional PPP literature better suits the data. The
fact that unemployment prevailed over the output gap and the real unit
labour cost means that in￿ ation di⁄erentials are not driven by either
di⁄erent cost structures or di⁄erent market imperfections, rather by dif-
ferences in e⁄ective demand in di⁄erent regions possibly due to sectorial
specialization of each region and credit market imperfections. As a con-
sequence, it is safely possible to state that in￿ ation convergence appears
in this application to be conditional on unemployment.
Therefore, as highlighted by the literature regarding in￿ ation di⁄er-
entials within EMU, regions with higher unemployment rates will experi-
ence a persistent real depreciation (re-equilibrating mechanism), however
this will lead them to pay a higher real interest rate than regions with less
unemployment. What is more there is evidence that, due to market im-
perfections, lagging regions already pay an higher nominal interest rate
than more advanced one. For instance, Banca d￿ Italia (2000) estimated
the nominal interest rate charged by bank branches in the North West of
Italy in March 2000 to be 5.17%, in the North East 5.77, in Central Italy
6, in the South 7.34 and in the Italian islands 7.30. This also entails that
"equilibrating" and "dis-equilibrating" mechanisms pass through di⁄er-
ent markets: arbitrage mainly works through the goods market, whereas
the real interest rate channel works mainly through the capital market.
Merging the Phillips curve and the PPP literature also allowed to
reconsider the issue of the long run vertical Phillips curve. In the
light of the recent contributions questioning the existence of a vertical
long run unemployment Phillips curve, such as Mankiw (2001), Gra-
ham and Snower (2003) and Vaona and Snower (2006) and, especially
for a regional setting, Hughes-Hallet (2000), I found evidence of a non-
vertical unemployment-in￿ ation relationship when considering a regional
dataset. Therefore, demand redistribution between regions could help
26to reduce the long-run aggregate unemployment rate.
Furthermore the PPP literature overlooked the importance of future
in￿ ation expectations. This could explain the puzzles of mobile regional
in￿ ation rates converging slowly and the absence of a smooth sigma
in￿ ation convergence. These descriptive features cannot be found in un-
employment and so, though this variable can help to explain why some
regions may experience long lasting de￿ ationary processes, it is unlikely
to give a thorough explanation for the volatility and the dispersion of
regional in￿ ation rates. To this purpose the fact that in￿ ation expec-
tations signi￿cantly a⁄ect present in￿ ation rates is more promising, as
changes in expectations can explain the high volatility of in￿ ation rates.
Finally, the importance of in￿ ation expectations may help to explain
why there is a positive correlation between the dispersion and the average
level of in￿ ation, allowing central banks to reduce in￿ ation without a
sizeable portion of regions falling into de￿ ation.
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32Figure. 1: Standard Deviation and Average Level of the Italian Provincial Inflation Rates 
from 1987 to 1998 































































Figure 2: Inflation Rates Dynamics Across Italian Provinces: Estimated Stochastic 
Kernel (t-τ: 1987, t: 1998) 
 















Figure 4: Value Added Dynamics Across Italian Provinces 
































Figure 6: Dynamics of the Log of the Real Unit Labour Cost Across Italian Provinces 
















 Figure 7: The Long-run Phillips Curve for Different Years 






















Table 1: Moran’s I statistics for the inflation rate (π), the log of the value added (y), the 
unemployment rate (u) and the log of the real unit labour cost (mc) before and after 
spatial filtering (p-values in parentheses). 
 
Variable  Before Filtering  After Filtering 
15.37 -0.15 
π 
 (0.00)   (0.88) 
15.24 -3.69 
y 
 (0.00)   (0.00) 
9.39 -1.42 
u 
 (0.00)   (0.15) 
15.18 -2.44 
mc 
 (0.00)   (0.02) 
    
 Table 2: System GMM estimates for different model specifications - Dependent 
variable: πt  (p-values in parentheses) 
 Model  Specification 




(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
0.50  0.51  0.48 0.50 0.52 0.60 0.41  0.43  0.57  0.53 - 
πt+1 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) - 
0.14  0.15  0.15 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.29  0.13  0.22  0.23  0.69 
πt-1 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.02) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
0.06  -  - - - - -  -  -  -  -  y  (0.10)  -  - - - - -  -  -  -  - 
-  0.01  - - - - -  -  -  -  -  mc  -  (0.97)  - - - - -  -  -  -  - 
-  -  -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  -0.01 -  u  -  -  (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02)  (0.17)  (0.03)  (0.01)  - 
0.40  0.37  0.36  - - - -  0.04  0.09  -  -  d1987  (0.40)  (0.43)  (0.44)  - - - -  (0.94)  (0.93)  -  - 
-0.15  -0.20  -0.15  - - - -  -0.25  -0.67  -  -  d1988  (0.74)  (0.68)  (0.75)  - - - -  (0.62)  (0.17)  - - 
1.70  1.66  1.70 1.51 1.39 1.53  -  1.34  1.10  1.47 -  d1989  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)  -  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  - 
0.60  0.56  0.61  - - - -  0.13  -0.02  0.87  -  d1990  (0.18)  (0.20)  (0.16)  - - - -  (0.74)  (0.75)  (0.01) - 
1.14  1.09  1.13 0.88 0.81 0.95  -  0.51  0.67 -  -  d1991  (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)  -  (0.05)  (0.02)  -  - 
1.31  1.29  1.30 1.04 1.03 1.26  -  0.52  0.77  1.03 -  d1992  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)  -  (0.02)  (0.06)  (0.00)  - 
0.42  0.40  0.40  - - - -  0.25  -0.13  -  -  d1993  (0.16)  (0.18)  (0.17)  - - - -  (0.46)  (0.55)  -  - 
0.11  0.09  0.11  - - - -  0.41  -0.36  -  -  d1994  (0.75)  (0.78)  (0.73)  - - - -  (0.24)  (0.18)  - - 
1.24  1.23  1.25 1.10 1.02  -  0.88  0.23  1.44  1.62 -  d1995  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  -  (0.00)  (0.32)  (0.00)  (0.00)  - 
0.80  0.80  0.80 0.60 0.59  -  -  0.48  0.27 -  -  d1996  (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) (0.02) (0.05)  -  -  (0.16)  (0.40)  - - 
0.05  0.05  0.05  - - -  -0.45  0.09  -0.09  -  -  d1997  (0.81)  (0.81)  (0.81)  - - -  (0.00)  (0.66)  (0.62)  -  - 
-0.67  -0.65  -0.67 -0.47 -0.43 -0.65 -0.13  -0.30  -0.30  -0.46 -  cons  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.05)  (0.07)  (0.13)  (0.00)  - 
67.52  68.79  66.63 72.14 72.14 13.19 57.51  21.69  32.00  37.07  78.13  Sargan 
Test  (0.36)  (0.32)  (0.39) (0.41) (0.41) (0.58) (0.31)  (1.00)  (1.00)  (0.07)  (0.41) 
-5.82  -5.83  -5.85 -6.04 -5.64 -3.64 -5.53  -4.73  -4.44  -5.75  -5.54  AB test 
for AR 
(1)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
1.78  1.80  1.71 1.77 1.56 1.75 1.91  2.77  0.97  1.39  1.51  AB test 
for AR 
(2)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.06)  (0.00)  (0.33)  (0.16)  (0.13) 
1.80  1.80  1.83 1.83 1.67  -  -  -  -  - -  Moran’s 
I  (0.07)  (0.07)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.10)  -  -  -  -  - - 
Obs. 868  868  868 868 868 430 438  448  420  868  868 
N. of 
groups  81  81  81 81 81 76 77  39  42  81  81 
N. of 
instr  79  79  79 79 79 22 59  79  79  34  77  
Table 3: Share of regions in deflation for different average inflation rates (assuming a 
cross-sectional normal distribution for inflation) 
 
πavg. Adj. σ  Non adj. σ
2.0 0.0001 0.0228 
1.9 0.0002 0.0287 
1.8 0.0003 0.0359 
1.7 0.0005 0.0446 
1.6 0.0008 0.0548 
1.5 0.0012 0.0668 
1.4 0.0019 0.0808 
1.3 0.0030 0.0968 
1.2 0.0047 0.1151 
1.1 0.0074 0.1357 
1.0 0.0115 0.1587 
0.9 0.0180 0.1841 
0.8 0.0278 0.2119 
0.7 0.0427 0.2420 
0.6 0.0649 0.2743 
0.5 0.0970 0.3085 
0.4 0.1424 0.3446 
0.3 0.2043 0.3821 
0.2 0.2850 0.4207 
0.1 0.3847 0.4602 
0 0.5000  0.5000 
 
Note: non-adjusted σ  is equal to one. 
 